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In her article “Abortion and Regret,” Kate Greasley considers pro-life argu-
ments from the experience of women who regret their abortions.1 An asymmetry 
exists between women with crisis pregnancies who give birth and women with crisis 
pregnancies who get abortions. Among women who abort, some do not regret their 
experiences but others experience profound regret. Among women who give birth, 
virtually none regret their choice and virtually all believe it was the right decision. 
What is the moral significance, if any, of this asymmetry? In The Ethics of 
Abortion, I highlight this asymmetry in the context of pro-abortion arguments, such 
as the violinist analogy, that do not deny fetal pesonhood but assess the burdens of 
continuing a pregnancy.2 According to Judith Jarvis Thomson, who first proposed the 
analogy, if you could save an unborn human being through just five minutes effort, 
it would be wrong not to do so. However, pregnancy is a huge imposition, imposing 
a substantial burden on the woman in question, so she is doing nothing wrong in 
detaching herself from the prenatal human being. 
But as David Boonin points out in his book A Defense of Abortion, to set the 
analogy straight we must also consider the burdens and costs of abortion itself.3 In 
this context, I cite in The Ethics of Abortion empirical and anecdotal evidence that 
the decision to have an abortion is often regretted, but the decision to give birth is 
1. Kate Greasley, “Abortion and Regret,” Journal of Medical Ethics 38.12 
(December 2012): 705–711, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100522.
2. Christopher Kaczor, The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the 
Question of Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 176–184. See also Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.1 (Fall 1971): 47–66.
3. David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 241.
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almost never regretted.4 Maya Angelou provides a striking example in her essay 
“The Decision that Changed My Life: Keeping My Baby.” She writes,
When I was 16, a boy in high school evinced interest in me, so I had sex with 
him—just once. And after I came out of that room, I thought, Is that all there 
is to it? My goodness, I’ll never do that again! Then, when I found out I was 
pregnant, I went to the boy and asked him for help, but he said it wasn’t his 
baby and he didn’t want any part of it.
I was scared to pieces. Back then, if you had money, there were some girls 
who got abortions, but I couldn’t deal with that idea. Oh, no. No. I knew there 
was somebody inside me. So I decided to keep the baby.
I’m telling you that the best decision I ever made was keeping that baby! Yes, 
absolutely. [My Son] Guy was a delight from the start—so good, so bright, 
and I can’t imagine my life without him. Years later, when I was married, I 
wanted to have more children, but I couldn’t conceive. Isn’t it wonderful that 
I had a child at 16? Praise God!5
To generalize, both continuing a pregnancy and having an abortion can 
significantly burden a woman. But one choice leads almost always to the joy Angelou 
describes, while the other may lead to serious regret. So, to correspond to the reality 
of crisis pregnancy, the violinist argument must take into account the certain and 
possible burdens of a crisis pregnancy whether abortion is chosen or not. 
Greasley’s paper ignores the context of my assessment of the violinist defense 
of abortion. However, she notes, quite properly, that the emotion of regret does not 
always accurately track the moral impermissibility of an action. Someone might feel 
regret for an action that is morally permissible.6 For example, I may seriously regret 
not turning out for the cross-country team my freshman year of high school, but this 
is not a sign that my decision was ethically wrong. Likewise, the absence of regret 
is not necessarily a sign that an action was permissible. I do not regret everything 
I did wrong my freshman year (in part because I do not remember everything I did 
wrong, and I have no feelings about deeds I have forgotten). Yet the fact that I lack 
the emotion of regret is no sign that my immoral actions were not in fact wrong. 
Moreover, as Aristotle points out, a virtuous person will take pleasure and 
experience pain in different actions than will a vicious person.7 The virtuous person 
delights in doing virtuous actions, but the vicious person delights in doing vicious 
actions and suffers in doing virtuous ones. If the vicious person is compelled to do 
what is right, say by fear of public shame, he does not enjoy performing just actions. 
Rather it pains the vicious person to do what it would give joy to the virtuous per-
son to do. In contrast, the virtuous person suffers in doing a vicious action (perhaps 
because she has a rare moment of weakness of will). So pain, such as regret for a 
4. Kaczor, Ethics of Abortion, 181–184.
5. Maya Angelou, “The Decision That Changed My Life: Keeping My Baby,” 
Family Circle, October 8, 2001, quoted in Steven Ertelt, “Maya Angelou,” LifeNews.com, 
May 28, 2014, http://www.lifenews.com/.
6. Greasley, “Abortion and Regret,” 707.
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1173b20–22.
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choice, and pleasure, such as satisfaction in a choice, do not determine the rightness 
or wrongness of the choice, in part because the character of the agent infl uences what 
sort of actions give pleasure or pain.
Where does this leave us in terms of the permissibility of abortion? On Aris-
totle’s view, a virtuous person will be pained at doing an unjust action but a vicious 
person will not. So if abortion is impermissible, the unjust killing of an innocent 
human being, it is the kind of action for which an otherwise virtuous person would 
likely experience serious regret. On the other hand, a vicious person would likely 
not experience serious regret for such a deed. If Aristotle’s analysis of character is 
correct, and if abortion is an unjust action, his analysis makes sense of the disparate 
experiences of women who choose abortion. 
On the other hand, if abortion is ethically permissible, we can still explain the 
difference between the women who seriously regret an abortion and those who do 
not. In a just war, soldiers may licitly use violence to stop the aggressive actions of 
enemy soldiers. This use of violence, though ethically permissible, may nevertheless 
lead to post-traumatic stress syndrome and other potentially devastating emotional 
repercussions. These negative emotions do not, however, make the use of force 
impermissible in a just war. 
If we adopt the violinist defense of abortion, the burdens of pregnancy and the 
burdens of abortion are relevant for determining whether abortion is ethically per-
missible. The burdens and benefi ts of an action include all the certain and possible 
consequences that accompany and follow the action. Greasley suggests that some 
possible consequences should be excluded from consideration: “It is clear that the 
question of what is best to do is still one that [the person considering abortion] must 
grapple with at the time of the decision, and that she cannot be helped along by the 
understanding that she would, in any event, ultimately be unable to regret choos-
ing motherhood.”8 But surely, if we are to compare the burdens and benefi ts of two 
courses of action, the fact that one course promises freedom from serious emotional 
disturbances is at least one important factor in making the decision. How could it be 
totally irrelevant unless we are to simply dismiss the importance of possible future 
consequences altogether? On what basis do we select some possible future conse-
quences as relevant but dismiss others as irrelevant? 
While it is true that the best choice may not be the choice that precludes all 
regret, it is also true that potential regret cannot be ignored if we are to make a properly 
informed judgment. It is, therefore, a non sequitur to claim that “using the possibil-
ity or likelihood of regrets to deter women from abortion is rationally unfounded at 
best, and at worst, emotionally manipulative.”9 Surely, we cannot choose wisely by 
ignoring relevant factors, including the emotional effects of the choice on all involved. 
Consider the following case: A woman who is pregnant for the fi rst time chooses 
to have an abortion. Later she tries to get pregnant, but despite years of effort is never 
able to conceive again. She may come to regret her abortion, since the pregnancy she 
8. Greasley, “Abortion and Regret,” 711.
9. Ibid.
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ended turned out to be her only pregnancy. Suppose this happens to many women, 
and numerous support groups are formed and self-help books written to help those 
suffering from abortion-induced sterility. To make a sound decision about continuing 
a pregnancy, surely a woman should take into account, even aside from concerns 
about prenatal life, the fact that abortion makes many women sterile. If a woman 
knew with certainty that this pregnancy was her first and her last, this fact might 
determine whether abortion was (all things considered) really in her overall, long-
term best interest. Similarly, if a woman knew with certainty that an abortion would 
cause her serious emotional disturbance for years to come, it would be absurd for her 
not to take this fact into account. What is more or less likely to happen is relevant 
to the decision.
The prolife view does not, of course, hinge on these factors. The permissibility 
of intentionally killing a human being prior to birth does not depend on the emo-
tional reactions of the mother, father, abortionist, or anyone else. Intentionally killing 
innocent human beings is wrong, and the wrongness does not hinge on anyone’s 
emotional reactions. In the context of the violinist argument, however, the actual 
and the possible burdens and the benefits of abortion must be compared with the 
actual and possible burdens of the alternative. Thomson’s original argument simply 
ignores the actual and possible costs of abortion. The interests of women and their 
informed consent for the procedures cannot be secured by ignoring the experience 
of thousands and thousands of women who experience searing regret following 
their abortions. Moreover, if abortion is unjust, it is never in the moral interests of 
someone to have one. 
In their article “Morally Relevant Potential,” David Hershenov and Rose Her-
shenov also examine the ethics of abortion by exploring another way to ground fetal 
moral worth.10 First, they distinguish between something being in an individual’s 
interest on the one hand and someone taking an interest in something on the other. 
Learning to read is in a young child’s interest, but a young child may not take an 
interest in learning to read. Put in other terms, it is good for a young child to learn 
to read (it is in her interest), but the child may not recognize that literacy is good 
for her and so take no interest in learning to read. Similarly, eating “broccoli is in 
a child’s interest, but he is not interested in it.”11 Living things like plants, animals, 
and human beings have an interest in health and physical flourishing. Some things 
are good for them (such as proper nourishment), and other things are bad for them 
(such as disease and premature death). How does this apply to the human being in 
or ex utero?
Our contention is that the morally relevant sense of potential is determined by 
what is healthy development or proper functioning for things of that kind in 
their design environment. The potential of a healthy human fetus is to develop 
a mind of great cognitive and affective abilities that will enable it to enter into 
various rewarding relationships with others and exercise a range of cognitive 
10. David B. Hershenov and Rose J. Hershenov, “Morally Relevant Potential,” Journal 
of Medical Ethics 41.3 (March 2015): 268–271.
11. Ibid., 268.
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skills that enable it to think and act in valuable ways unlike any other kind of 
living being. So its potential means that it will be greatly harmed if deprived 
of that valuable future.12
The healthy development of a plant extends only to activities such as growth 
and assimilation of nutrition. By contrast, the healthy development of a human being 
also includes such goods as friendship, knowledge, and personal integrity. The Her-
shenovs write, “Health is a necessary condition for fl ourishing and constitutive of 
a good deal of valuable well-being in a healthy person. The living always have an 
interest in health-produced fl ourishing. All fl ourishing depends upon health being 
present (to some) degree, and every living being has an interest in health at every 
stage of its life, including its fetal stages.”13 Morally relevant potential is, as they 
note, determined by proper functioning. 
The Hershenovs consider the objection, raised by Michael Tooley and Peter 
Singer, that a prenatal or newborn human being cannot have intrinsic value based on 
his or her potential because such a view leads to absurdities: If potentiality invests 
an individual with basic rights, then all of our skin cells have a right to life, since 
all our skin cells have the potential, via cloning, to become adult human beings. If 
a rationality serum were invented, every kitten would have the potential to become 
rational and would thereby have a right to life as well. Replies to these kinds of 
objections typically distinguish between the intrinsic potential, or activity potentiality, 
enjoyed by the prenatal or newborn human being and the merely extrinsic potential, 
or passive potentiality that could be gained by a skin cell through cloning or by a 
kitten by means of a rationality serum. 
The Hershenovs’ understanding of potential suggests an alternative response to 
the objections raised against basing a human fetus’s right to live on his or her poten-
tial. Since the proper functioning of a kitten does not include functioning rationally, 
the example given by Tooley is irrelevant. Similarly, the potential of a skin cell to 
become a person through cloning is irrelevant, since the proper functioning of a skin 
cell does not include developing into a rational being. So the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic potentiality is not needed to defend the right to live of human 
beings in utero, nor is the distinction between active and passive potentiality needed.14
Is this account compatible with the equal basic worth of all human beings? The 
Hershenovs write, “Alternatively, the harm may be as great, if not greater, for the 
younger fetus or newborn, but they have less intrinsic value, and so their interests 
matter less than older children with more value.”15 It is true that a newborn has less 
intrinsic value than an older child? On one view, all human beings in whatever stage 
of development (fetal, neonatal, toddler, adult, senior) have not only intrinsic value 
12. Ibid., 269, original emphasis.
13. Ibid., original emphasis.
14. The Hershenovs view these distinctions as problematic in defending the rights of 
human beings prior to birth, but their echoing of the critics of others I’ll leave unexplored 
for now.
15. Hershenov and Hershenov, “Morally Relevant Potential” 270.
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but equal intrinsic value. But perhaps this claim of equality is misplaced. Suppose 
for the sake of argument that twenty-four-carat gold has intrinsic value. You can 
certainly imagine greater or lesser quantities of twenty-four karat gold. Or let’s say 
the virtues have intrinsic value. Virtues are not merely good as a means but splendid 
as ends in themselves. Supposing that the thesis of the unity of the virtues is false, 
you could imagine one person who had only the virtue of courage and another per-
son who had more intrinsic value because he had both the virtue of courage and the 
virtue of justice. So the death of the courageous person would be less harmful than 
the death of the courageous and just person, since the latter person had more intrinsic 
value. This conclusion is compatible with holding that all human beings have equal 
basic worth, since in addition to this equal basic worth we would add other factors 
of value such as having the virtues.
Further disambiguating the term “interests” is Peter Kock’s article “Ambiguous 
Interests: Maternal Desires and Fetal Interests.”16 He distinguishes between three 
senses of the term, illustrated by the following examples: (1) It is in the fetus’s best 
interest that the mother not smoke while pregnant. (2) Francesca revealed her interest 
in studying art history in Florence. (3) Shane expressed an interest in suicide to the 
clinician, knowing that he would be admitted to the hospital and fed.17 
The first example is of implied interests, the realization of which promotes the 
welfare of the one with the interest. Although no fetus knows about fetal alcohol 
syndrome, every human being in utero has an implied interest in avoiding fetal alco-
hol syndrome. The second example is of cognitive interests in which an agent has 
desires or preferences, which can be either expressed (if they are communicated to 
others) or not expressed (if they are not revealed to others). Cognitive interests may 
be in contradiction to implied interests, as when a drug addict desires to get another 
fix (cognitive interest), even if the fix will prompt a collapse of recovery and a huge 
setback for the addict’s long-term health and happiness (implied interests). The addict 
on the verge of death may not have a cognitive interest in sobriety, but he has an 
implied interest in sobriety. The third example is “inauthentic interests,” in which 
expressed interests contradict cognitive interests. In Koch’s example, Shane does 
not have a cognitive interest in suicide, but he makes the threat of suicide simply 
to secure food from the hospital. Other forms of inauthentic interests include the 
interests expressed by those who are not in a sound state of mind, such as toddlers 
and the intoxicated. 
In this article, Koch critiques the view that the pregnant mother always is more 
knowledgeable than others about the implied fetal interests. Even though there is 
always a physical bond between mother and child, this physical unity does not give 
the expectant mother knowledge about what serves the implied interests of her pre-
natal son or daughter. Use of a particular medical treatment might be in the implied 
fetal interests, but unless the mother also happens to be a physician and happens to 
16. Peter Koch, “Ambiguous Interests: Maternal Desires and Fetal Interests,” American 
Journal of Bioethics 16.2 (2016): 31–33.
17. Ibid., 32.
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know the medical condition of her son or daughter in utero, the mother would not be 
aware of what is medically indicated and in her child’s implied interests. 
Another way maternal interests and fetal interests might be related is that fetal 
interests are the same as the women’s cognitive interests. “This would imply that 
concern about the fetus is only a concern about the desires of t he mother for the fetus, 
whatever these desires may be—even for the death of the fetus if she does not want 
to give birth” or for the disability of the fetus if she wants to continue heavy drug 
use throughout the pregnancy.18 Early death or grave disability is obviously not in 
the implied fetal interest, so we cannot reduce fetal interests to maternal cognitive 
interests. If interests ground moral worth, then implied fetal interests can ground 
fetal worth.
chrisTopher kAczor
18. Ibid.
